Hindustan Unilever v. Kwick Living: Territorial Jurisdiction

Factual Matrix

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The plaintiff, Hindustan Unilever Limited, has instituted the present suit (CS(COMM) 904/2026) against Kwick Living (I) Private Limited, seeking a permanent injunction. The suit primarily targets an advertisement campaign titled “War on What’s Hidden”. The plaintiff alleges that this campaign denigrates and disparages its products, specifically “Vim” and “Surf Excel”, by utilizing misleading claims. These advertisements are reportedly disseminated through billboards, social media platforms, and the defendant’s own website.

Upon the issuance of summons on 19 August 2026, the defendant raised a preliminary objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The defendant contends that the court lacks the authority to adjudicate the dispute. Both parties have filed their respective pleadings regarding the interim injunction application (I.A. 22515/2026). The court opted to reserve its judgment specifically on the preliminary issue of territorial jurisdiction before addressing the merits of the interim relief.

Applicable Law and Statutory Provisions

The determination of territorial jurisdiction in this matter rests upon three primary legislative frameworks:

• Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): This provision dictates where a suit must be instituted, typically requiring it to be filed in a court where the defendant resides, carries on business, or where the cause of action arises, in whole or in part.
• Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999: This section mandates that suits for trademark infringement or passing off must be instituted in a District Court having jurisdiction, providing a specific forum for registered proprietors to seek protection.
• Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957: This provision similarly specifies that proceedings for copyright infringement must be brought in the District Court within whose jurisdiction the person instituting the suit resides, carries on business, or works for gain.

The interplay between these provisions, particularly regarding the concept of a plaintiff’s “place of business” and the “accrual of cause of action,” forms the core of the judicial analysis.

Judicial Analysis

The defendant’s challenge relies heavily on the principle that where a plaintiff has a registered office and the cause of action also arises there, the plaintiff is precluded from opting for a distant forum simply by virtue of having a subordinate office in that secondary location. This interpretation draws from the Supreme Court decision in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs. Sanjay Dalia. The court noted that the purpose of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62 of the Copyright Act was to alleviate the burden on plaintiffs to travel to distant courts, not to grant them the right to forum shop when the cause of action exists at their principal place of business.

The defendant further supported its position by citing Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, which refined the “carries on business” test. The court emphasized that in cases where a plaintiff maintains a principal office and a branch office, and the cause of action arises at the principal office, the suit must be filed there. The plaintiff cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court where it merely maintains a subordinate office if the cause of action is not connected to that specific jurisdiction.

Regarding the online dissemination of the impugned campaign, the defendant invoked the Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. vs. A. Murali Krishna Reddy precedent. The defense argued that mere accessibility of a website within Delhi is insufficient to establish jurisdiction. The plaintiff must demonstrate “purposeful availment” of the jurisdiction, suggesting that the defendant specifically targeted the forum state and conducted commercial activities therein. The defendant pointed out that the plaintiff’s plaint refers to specific hoarding evidence found in Mumbai, with no concrete proof of similar physical presence or specific commercial targeting within the Delhi jurisdiction.

The defendant highlighted that the plaintiff failed to provide invoices or sales data to show that the defendant’s competing products were actually sold in Delhi, nor did it establish that the online campaign was structured to target Delhi consumers specifically. Consequently, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s attempt to establish jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC, based solely on internet accessibility, fails the “effects” test and the “sliding scale” test established in established jurisprudence.

Furthermore, the defendant relied on Escorts Limited vs. Tejpal Singh Sisodia, which cautions against assuming jurisdiction in defamation or disparagement cases simply because digital content is accessible globally. The court in that instance suggested that a corporation’s reputation is usually tied to its place of business, and the mere potential for digital access does not grant a plaintiff the unfettered right to sue in any jurisdiction of its choosing.

Also Read: Calcutta HC Returns ITC Plaint for Skipping Section 12A Mediation

Practical and Commercial Implications

The current legal stance in the Delhi High Court places a significant evidentiary burden on corporate plaintiffs seeking to sue for disparagement or intellectual property infringement in a forum where their primary commercial activities do not originate. The reliance on the Banyan Tree framework ensures that plaintiffs cannot circumvent the requirements of Section 20 of the CPC through the mere existence of a universally accessible website.

For legal practitioners, this necessitates a more rigorous approach to pleading. A plaintiff must now provide specific documentation, such as sales invoices, targeted advertising metrics, or evidence of specific commercial transactions, to establish that a defendant has purposefully directed its activity into the forum state. General assertions that a brand’s reputation is harmed globally or that a website can be accessed from a particular city are insufficient to satisfy the threshold for territorial jurisdiction.

The outcome of this jurisdictional challenge will dictate whether corporations can maintain the flexibility to file suits at their branch offices or whether they will be strictly tethered to the location of their registered offices or the primary site of the cause of action. As businesses continue to operate through digital platforms, the tension between the “long arm” provisions of the Trade Marks and Copyright Acts and the restrictive interpretation of Section 20 of the CPC remains a defining feature of Indian IP litigation. Practitioners should advise clients to document the local impact of alleged infringements meticulously, as this remains the decisive factor in surviving a jurisdictional challenge.

In the present matter, the court has reserved its decision on this jurisdictional threshold, which will eventually determine if the suit proceeds in the Delhi High Court or is returned to the plaintiff for filing in the appropriate jurisdiction. The case underscores the necessity of aligning pleadings with existing judicial interpretations of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62 of the Copyright Act, ensuring that the convenience intended for the plaintiff is not used as a mechanism for procedural overreach.