Serum Institute v Tengra: Bombay HC Rules on Section 79 IT Act and YouTube Takedown

In Serum Institute of India Pvt. Ltd. & Adar Poonawalla v. Yohan Tengra & Ors. [2026:BHC-OS:21322], the Bombay High Court (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction) partially allowed an interim application filed by vaccine manufacturer Serum Institute of India and its CEO Adar Poonawalla, issuing mandatory takedown directions against X Corp (Defendant No. 7) for newly published defiant content while establishing strict doctrinal boundaries on intermediary liability under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and holding that intermediaries cannot be transformed into universal adjudicators or super censors.

The Corporate Reputation Battleground: Serum Institute’s Passing Off Claim Against Anti-Vax Influencers

The litigation instituted by Serum Institute of India and Adar Poonawalla highlights the complex interface between corporate reputation, personality rights, and commercial disparagement. Plaintiff No. 1, as a premier global manufacturer of lifesaving biological products, including vaccines distributed to over 170 countries under National Immunization Programmes, maintains immense corporate goodwill tied directly to its trade identity, corporate name, and associated marks such as Covishield and Covavax. Plaintiff No. 2, as the Chief Executive Officer, embodies the executive goodwill of the enterprise.

The defendants, led by anti-vaccination influencer Yohan Tengra and associated platforms, launched targeted digital campaigns branding the plaintiffs as purveyors of lethal products and characterizing the CEO as a mass murderer. Under Indian commercial jurisprudence, corporate goodwill is a species of property protected against injurious falsehood, defamation, and passing off. While traditional passing off protects trade marks against misrepresentation causing confusion in the marketplace, the modern common law protects corporate identity and commercial reputation against malicious misrepresentations that erode consumer trust and sever customer-to-business relations.

The dissemination of unverified, defamatory anti-vaccination disinformation masquerading as independent health commentary constitutes actionable passing off of corporate identity and malicious falsehood. By attaching the corporate name and executive persona of Serum Institute to criminal allegations of mass homicide, the defendants sought to misappropriate public anxiety for notoriety and ideological warfare. Justice Gauri Godse’s ruling affirms that corporate plaintiffs can successfully invoke equitable remedies to protect their commercial standing against smear campaigns designed to impair corporate capital and institutional goodwill.

The Intermediary Liability Conundrum: Section 79 IT Act, Safe Harbour, and YouTube/X Corp’s Obligations

The central doctrinal battleground in this dispute revolves around Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which provides statutory safe harbour protection to intermediaries hosting third-party content. Intermediaries such as Google LLC and X Corp are insulated from direct liability for user-generated content, provided they satisfy the statutory due diligence requirements set out in Section 79(2). However, this safe harbour is conditional. Under Section 79(3)(b), the exemption stands vitiated if the intermediary, upon receiving actual knowledge that information residing on its computer resource is being used to commit unlawful acts, fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material.

The interpretation of actual knowledge has evolved significantly through judicial pronouncements. In the landmark judgment of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court read down Section 79(3)(b) to clarify that actual knowledge cannot be inferred from private notices or arbitrary complaints sent by affected individuals, as intermediaries lack adjudicatory machinery to determine the legality of speech. Instead, actual knowledge must emanate strictly through the medium of a binding court order or a notification from an appropriate government agency.

In the present application, X Corp resisted takedown demands on the ground that the original injunction order dated 5 June 2023 was directed solely against Defendants No. 1 to 5 and contained no specific operational command addressed to X Corp. The Bombay High Court addressed this defense by analyzing the statutory framework alongside the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. The court reiterated that while intermediaries cannot be compelled to act as private censors over vague complaints, a binding court order identifying specific unlawful URLs creates an absolute legal duty of compliance.

Thus, the object of the legal framework under the IT Act and the said Rules is to remove or disable access to prohibited content published, uploaded, or stored by the originator by following the prescribed procedure.

Hon’ble Ms. Justice Gauri Godse, High Court of Judicature at Bombay

Mandatory Injunctions and Platform Accountability: Order XXXIX and the Three-Prong Test

Granting interim mandatory injunctions under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 requires a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny. Unlike prohibitory injunctions that preserve status quo, mandatory injunctions compel the performance of positive acts to undo illegal deeds already consummated. Plaintiffs seeking mandatory relief must demonstrate a strong prima facie case of continuing injury, balance of convenience tilting heavily in their favor, and the imminence of irreparable harm.

In this case, Justice Godse evaluated the conduct of Defendant No. 1, who, on the very night the original injunction was pronounced in June 2023, uploaded a defiant video proclaiming refusal to obey the court order and doubling down on defamatory statements. The continued hosting of such material by X Corp post-notice, combined with fresh defiant uploads, satisfied all three equitable prongs. The viral nature of social media dissemination ensures that defamatory anti-vaccination videos compound reputational damage exponentially with each view, rendering monetary compensation inadequate.

However, the court drew a firm line regarding the breadth of relief. While granting mandatory takedown orders specifically targeting the newly uploaded defiant video under paragraph 17(b), the court declined sweeping prayers under paragraphs 17(c) and 17(d) that sought blanket algorithmic suppression, pre-moderation, and the wholesale suspension or deactivation of the defendants’ accounts. The court reasoned that issuing perpetual, unspecific mandates against intermediaries would force platforms into the forbidden domain of judicial adjudication, converting digital intermediaries into super censors.

The ‘Actual Knowledge’ Doctrine: Enforcing Court Orders Against Big Tech Platforms in India

The decision provides critical clarity on the doctrine of actual knowledge in Indian technology law. Big Tech platforms frequently argue that unless a judicial order explicitly names the intermediary and details exact technical parameters for removal, they are under no statutory duty to act. The Bombay High Court rejected this restrictive posture when paired with a subsisting court declaration holding specific content to be defamatory.

The ruling distinguishes between proactive general monitoring and reactive compliance with specific judicial determinations. While intermediaries are legally exempt from general surveillance obligations, once a competent court issues an injunction declaring specified content unlawful and the plaintiff serves that order upon the intermediary alongside identifiable URLs, the safe harbour recedes. X Corp’s refusal to act on the ground that the initial order lacked a direct procedural command against the intermediary was exposed as legally untenable, particularly given that Google LLC readily complied upon receiving identical notification.

Furthermore, the court addressed the procedural history, noting that the original injunction dated 5 June 2023 had attained finality as review petitions were withdrawn and no appellate reversal occurred. Consequently, the plaintiffs were fully entitled to seek enforcement of the underlying mandate, while their failure to secure direct intermediary wording in the initial draft did not permanently immunize the platform from subsequent remedial applications when fresh contemptuous material was introduced.

Also Read: Bombay HC Restrains Nectar Life Care in Sun Pharma Trademark Dispute

Corporate Litigation Strategy: Protecting Pharma Brand Equity Against Disinformation Campaigns

For corporate counsel representing life-sciences corporations, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and high-profile executives, the Bombay High Court ruling serves as a vital strategic roadmap for managing digital disinformation and reputation attacks. Counsel must adopt a structured, multi-pronged litigation methodology:

• Precise URL Identification: When drafting interim injunction applications, counsel must meticulously log and annex specific URLs, handles, and digital identifiers of offending content to satisfy the judicial requirement for identifiable material, avoiding overly broad prayers that invite rejection under the rule against judicial delegation.
• Dual-Targeting of Originators and Intermediaries: Pleadings must name both the primary originators of disinformation and the host intermediaries, utilizing formal statutory takedown notices under the Intermediary Guidelines 2021 immediately upon securing interim orders to establish the foundational actual knowledge required under Section 79(3)(b).
• Combating Defiance via Order XXXIX Rule 2A: Where defendants and influencers publish defiant videos mocking court orders, counsel must promptly file composite applications seeking both mandatory removal against intermediaries under Order XXXIX Rule 2 and contempt proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2A, or Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
• Preserving Corporate Reputation Without Overreach: Avoid framing prayers that demand permanent account deletions or pre-censorship algorithms at the interim stage, as Indian courts consistently protect free speech boundaries by refusing to elevate intermediaries into adjudicators, focusing instead on targeted takedowns of adjudicated unlawful speech.

It is unfortunate that sometimes the parties and their advocates, instead of following the procedure known to law, engage in making bald, baseless and derogatory remarks against other parties and the judges.

Hon’ble Ms. Justice Gauri Godse, High Court of Judicature at Bombay

, Serum Institute of India v. Yohan Tengra reinforces the sanctity of judicial orders, balances intermediary safe harbour protections with mandatory compliance duties, and establishes that calculated digital defiance by social media influencers will meet with swift remedial intervention and contempt proceedings under Indian civil procedure.