Hindustan Unilever v. Kwick Living: Delhi HC Settles Jurisdiction

Core Controversy

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The Delhi High Court, in Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Kwick Living (I) Private Limited (FAO(OS)(COMM) 231/2026), addressed a procedural impasse concerning territorial jurisdiction in an intellectual property dispute. The appellant, Hindustan Unilever Limited, sought an ad-interim injunction against the respondent, Kwick Living (I) Private Limited, regarding an alleged infringing advertising campaign. However, the learned Single Judge, while seized of the interim application (I.A. 22515/2026), declined to decide the matter on its merits. Instead, the Single Judge reserved judgment on the issue of territorial jurisdiction and subsequently referred the matter to a Larger Bench, simultaneously staying the adjudication of the interim injunction application pending the outcome of that reference.

The respondent had challenged the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, asserting that since both parties maintained registered offices in Mumbai, the suit lacked a sufficient nexus to Delhi. The respondent argued that the plaintiff failed to plead essential facts regarding sales within Delhi or purposeful availment of jurisdiction via digital platforms. The Single Judge adopted the view that the maintainability of the suit was in doubt, thereby precluding the grant of any interim relief. This appeal challenged the decision to withhold adjudication on the interim application based on the unresolved question of jurisdiction.

Governing Legal Framework

The jurisdictional challenge centers on the interplay between statutory provisions governing the institution of suits and the established principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). Specifically, the litigation engages the following provisions:

• Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999: This provision allows a plaintiff to institute a suit for trade mark infringement in the court within whose local jurisdiction they reside or carry on business, effectively expanding the forum options beyond where the defendant resides or where the cause of action arises.
• Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957: Similar to its counterpart in the Trade Marks Act, this section provides the copyright holder the statutory right to file a suit where they reside or carry on business.
• Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: This section dictates the general rules for territorial jurisdiction, requiring a suit to be filed where the defendant resides, carries on business, works for gain, or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises.

The dispute required the court to reconcile these statutory mechanisms with the factual basis of the suit, particularly whether the presence of physical hoardings and the existence of a principal place of business in Delhi satisfy the jurisdictional threshold.

Court’s Reasoning

The Division Bench, led by Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, intervened to resolve the procedural deadlock. The Court examined the factual basis for jurisdiction anew, specifically considering evidence that was either missing or contested before the Single Judge. During the appellate proceedings, the respondent filed an affidavit confirming its possession of a GST registration in Delhi and identifying a principal place of business in the Naraina Industrial Area. Furthermore, counsel for the respondent admitted that physical hoardings containing the impugned advertisements were erected in Delhi prior to the institution of the suit and confirmed that the respondent actively sells its products within the jurisdiction.

The Court found these admissions dispositive. By identifying a declared principal place of business in Delhi and confirming that a part of the cause of action, specifically the advertising campaign, originated within the territory, the requirements of Section 20(a) and 20(c) of the CPC were satisfied. Section 20(a) relates to where the defendant carries on business, while Section 20(c) pertains to the place where the cause of action arises.

The Court noted that while the respondent initially contended that the suit must be confined to the pleadings as they stood at the time of filing, both parties eventually agreed to a pragmatic solution. Recognizing that jurisdiction must be supported by sufficient pleading, the respondent consented to the appellant amending the plaint to incorporate the two key facts: the respondent’s registered principal place of business in Delhi and the presence of the infringing hoardings. The Court determined that this procedural step would align the record with the established facts, rendering the objection to territorial jurisdiction moot.

Regarding the role of the Appellate Court, the Bench declined to rule on the merits of the interim injunction application. Citing the principle that the court of first instance should decide such matters, the Bench held that the case should be remanded to the Single Judge. This approach aligns with the jurisprudential requirement that the appellate court should avoid usurping the function of the trial court, particularly when factual or complex merits remain to be explored.

Holding and Relief

The Delhi High Court disposed of the appeal with specific directives designed to restore the case to the Single Judge for a swift, substantive decision:

• Finality of Jurisdiction: The Court explicitly held that the Delhi High Court possesses the requisite territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. It ruled that this issue is now settled and prohibited the respondent from re-agitating the jurisdictional challenge before the Single Judge.
• Leave to Amend: The appellant was granted leave to amend the plaint to incorporate two specific paragraphs (152(A) and 157(A)) detailing the respondent’s Delhi-based business operations and the physical presence of the infringing hoardings. The Court dispensed with the need for a formal amendment application, acknowledging the respondent’s consent to this procedure.
• Remand and Scheduling: The suit was ordered to be listed before the learned Single Judge on September 3, 2026. The Court set a tight timetable for the completion of the remaining arguments: the respondent is to conclude its reply submissions within 45 minutes, and the appellant is permitted 15 minutes for any rejoinder.
• Expedited Adjudication: The Division Bench requested that the learned Single Judge hear and decide the interim injunction application (I.A. 22515/2026) on its merits as expeditiously as possible.

The Court clarified that its order focused solely on the question of jurisdiction and the resulting procedural remand. It expressly noted that it did not express any opinion on the reference order dated August 25, 2026, which remains outside the scope of this specific appeal.

Also Read: Zee Entertainment v. BSNL: Madras High Court Permits Withdrawal of Copyright Suit

Practical Significance

This decision underscores the importance of the initial pleadings in intellectual property suits, particularly regarding jurisdictional averments. While the court maintained a flexible approach by allowing an amendment to the plaint to cure jurisdictional defects, the case illustrates the risks of failing to establish a clear nexus to the chosen forum at the outset. The respondent’s admission of a GST-registered place of business in Delhi proved to be the decisive factor, turning a potentially protracted jurisdictional battle into a resolved threshold issue.

For practitioners, the case serves as a reminder of the strategic necessity of grounding jurisdictional claims in concrete, provable facts such as statutory registrations, tax filings, and the physical presence of infringing material. The Court’s reliance on the respondent’s admissions highlights that while the plaint acts as the primary document for establishing jurisdiction, external evidence and admissions can play a decisive role in summary assessments.

Furthermore, the judgment reaffirms the judiciary’s preference for resolving interim applications on their merits rather than allowing procedural roadblocks to indefinitely postpone substantive relief. By directing the parties to conclude arguments within a precise timeframe, the Court signaled a clear intent to balance procedural rigor with the need for timely judicial intervention in cases where irreparable harm to goodwill is alleged. The decision balances the rights of the defendant to challenge venue with the rights of the plaintiff to obtain speedy adjudication of urgent interim relief, thereby streamlining the path for the Single Judge to determine the validity of the underlying infringement claims without further jurisdictional distractions.

Finally, the case highlights the distinction between the role of the Appellate Court and the court of first instance. By refusing to rule on the merits of the interim injunction, the Bench reinforced the systemic value of the Single Judge’s role in the initial assessment of fact-intensive IP disputes. The case stands as an example of how the appellate process can function effectively to resolve procedural bottlenecks, allowing the litigation to proceed to its essential phase without altering the intended hierarchy of the judicial process.